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SENTENCING IN INDIANA: APPELLATE
REVIEW OF THE TRIAL COURT'S
DISCRETION
J. ERIC SMITHBURN*
INTRODUCTION
No other aspect of the criminal justice system has received so
little attention in the development of its standards to insure pro-
cedural fairness as the sentencing of the criminal defendent. Tradi-
tionally, the determination of what punishment is appropriate for
the convicted is left to the discretion of the trial judge who in the
general absence of guidelines and criteria is free to impose any
sentence authorized from a broad range of statutory prescriptions.
As Professor Kenneth Davis has aptly stated in his commentary on
discretionary justice, under the traditional sentencing system,
the judge has no guide except a statutory mandate, such
as not-less than one year nor more than fifteen years. He
can do as he pleases within the limits. If he chooses, he
can focus on the crime alone, without considering the
criminal. He can act without a presentence investigation.
He can be guided by a theory of retribution, by a theory
of deterrence-or by no theory. He can give a wholly emo-
tional response and get approving headlines in the
newspapers by expressing indignation against the crime,
without making any effort to find a rational basis for any
facet of his decision. He can announce his decision without
findings, without reasons, without relating what he does
with what he has done before, and without relating his
*Judge, Marshall County Court, Plymouth, Indiana; Lecturer, Notre Dame
Law School; Lecturer, School of Public and Environmental Affairs (Criminal Justice),
Indiana University at South Bend; Faculty. National Judicial College, University of
Nevada (Reno); J.D., 1973, Indiana University.
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decision to the relevant decisions of other judges. His
discretionary power is so much at large that review by an
appellate court would usually be futile.1
Given this unguided and virtually unlimited discretion, the trial
judge is free to develop his own sentencing standards based solely
on the dictates of his own conscience and the attitudes he brings
with him to the bench. "In no other role can a judge so freely im-
pose a pattern of his personal reactions, philosophy, and animosity
as when he sentences a man who has no right of appeal though the
effect may be his own destruction."' While each judge in his own
mind seeks to provide equal justice under the law, the result is a
disparity in sentences in which the punishment may be as varied as
the judges themselves."
The practice in the United States' of leaving the awesome
responsibility of sentencing the criminal defendant to the trial judge
with little or no guidance from the legislature or supervising
judiciary, has been characterized as a "wasteland in the law." Our
approach to sentencing policy in general has been the subject of in-
creasing critical review and commentary.' Unwarranted sentencing
1. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 137-38 (1969).
2. Appellate Review of Sentences: A Symposium at the Judicial Conference
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 32 F.R.D. 249, 268 (1962)
(remarks of Chief Judge Sobeloff) [hereinafter cited as Symposium].
3. "In other words, a statutory system that leaves a wide, untrammeled
discretion to judges is the doom of equality of treatment." Rubin, Disparity and
Equality of Sentences-A Constitutional Challenge, 40 F.R.D. 55, 73 (1965). See also
Comment, Apellate Review of Sentences: A Survey, 17 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 221, 226 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Survey].
4. "In no other area of the law are judicial prerogatives so uncontrolled or
criteria so obscure -in no other country is such a situation permitted to exist." Sym-
posium, supra note 2, at 268. See generally Note, European Approaches to Problems
in the Sentencing Process, 3 NEW ENGLAND J. PRISON L. 171-226 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as European Approaches].
5. It may be noted in this regard that it is estimated that approximately
ninety per cent of those convicted of felonies plead guilty, waiving their right to trial.
For this ninety per cent, the most important concern is normally not pretrial and trial
procedures, but sentencing practices and corrections. Pugh and Carver, Due Process
and Sentencing: From Mapp to Mempa to McGautha, 49 TEXAS L. REV. 25, 26 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Pugh and Carver]. See also A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES 1 (Ap-
proved Draft 1967) [hereinafter cited as A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW].
6. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 54 (1972)
[hereinafter cited as Frankel].
7. M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973) [hereinafter
cited as M. FRANKEL]; Coburn, Disparity in Sentences and Appellate Review of
Sentences, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 207 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Coburn]; De Costa,
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variations resulting from unguided judicial discretion, it has been
argued, produce numerous negative consequences. They ate morally
offensive both to the defendant and to the citizenry, leading to
disrespect for the judicial process and potentially for the law itself
and are particularly disfunctional for prison rehabilitation efforts.
From the standpoint of judicial administration, they may cause
delays in the orderly scheduling of cases as attorneys vie for hear-
ings before judges perceived to be lenient. The appellate courts,
moreover, where not authorized to review sentences directly, may
tend to distort substantive law to provide relief from sentences
deemed to be grossly excessive!
Two significant developments, legislative and judicial, have
taken place in Indiana criminal law in recent months which may of-
fer an effective response to the problem of unguided discretionary
sentencing. The Indiana Penal Code has been revised to require that
the trial court, before sentencing a convicted felon, conduct a
separate hearing for the purpose of determining the appropriate
sentence and to make a record of the hearing which must include a
statement of the.court's reasons for selecting the sentence imposed.'
The General Assembly has also provided specific directives which
the trial court must consider in determining a proper sentence to
impose for any crime.10 The legislature also provided a list of criteria
which the court may consider in assessing the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances which may warrant an increase or reduc-
Disparity an Inequality of Criminal Sentences; Constitutional and Legislative Ap-
proaches of Appellate Review and Relocation of the Sentencing Function, 14 HOWARD
L.J. 29 (1968); D'Esposito, Sentencing Disparity; Causes and Cures, 60 J. CRIM. L., C. &
A.S. 182 (1969); Frankel, supra note 6; Frankel, The Sentencing Morass and a Sugges-
tion for Reform 3 CRim. L. BULL. 365 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. Frankel]; Hen-
nessey, Disparity in Sentencing, 3 NEw ENGLAND J. PRISON L. 5 (1976) [hereinaftr cited
as Hennessey]; Smith, The Sentencing Council and the Problem of Disproportionate
Sentences, 27 FED. PROB. 5 (1963); Zalman, A Commission Model of Sentencing, 53
NOTRE DAME LAW. 266 (1977).
8. Hoffman and De Gostin, An Argument for Self-Imposed Explicit Judicial
Sentencing Standards, 3 J. CRIM. JUST. 195, 196 (1975) (footnotes omitted) [hereinafter
cited as Hoffman and De Gostin].
9. IND. CODE 35-4.1-4-3, as added by Acts of 1976, Pub. L. 148, Acts of 1976,
Pub. L. 148, sec. 28, as amended by Acts of 1977. Pub. L. 340, sec. 151, provided that
this section takes effect October 1, 1977.
10. IND. CODE 35-4.1-4-7(a): "In determining what sentence to impose for a
crime, the court shall consider the risk that the person will commit another crime, the
nature and circumstances of the crime committed, and the prior criminal record,
character, and condition of the person." See notes 94-100 infra and accompanying text.
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tion of a sentence," or favor a suspended sentence or probation." In
addition to these legislative innovations, the Indiana Supreme Court
has promulgated rules to govern the appellate review of sentences
authorized by the Indiana Constitution." The announcement of these
rules apparently signals the court's preparedness to exercise its con-
stitutional prerogative to review criminal sentences, an invitation
which it has previously declined to accept."
This article will examine these recent developments in Indiana
criminal law against the background of the experiences of other
jurisdictions which authorize appellate review of sentences and have
11. It may be noted that the revised Indiana Penal Code provides for "deter-
minate" sentencing fixing a standard term of imprisonment for the various classifica-
tions of felonies. The court, however, retains the discretion to add a number of years
for aggravating circumstances. See IND. CODE § 35-50-2-1-35-50-2-9. Similarly, the trial
court may suspend a sentence for a misdemeanor and place the offender on probation,
and may suspend the fine determined for an infraction. IND. CODE § 35-50-3-1-.3; IND.
CODE §35-50-4-1-35-50-4-4.
The provision for this discretionary authority on the part of the sentencing
judge reflects the general agreement that a certain amount of discretion in sentencing
is essential:
While absolute uniformity is neither desirable nor attainable, it is im-
perative that a greater similarily of treatment of offenders must in-
evitably lead to differences in sentences, but this does not account for the
flagrant disparities which occur in cases where the only differentiating
factors are the geographical sites of the offense or the proclivities of the
sentencing judge.
Byrne, Federal Sentencing Procedures: Need for Reform, 42 L.A.B. BULL. 563 (1967).
See also Hoffman and De Gostin, supra note 8, at 196. For a discussion of determinate
sentencing in general along with a survey of authorities in this area, see RELATING TO
SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 143-158 (approved Draft 1968).
12. IND. CODE § 35-4.1-4-7, as added by Acts of 1976, Pub. L. 148, sec. 15. Acts
of 1976, Pub. L. 148, see. 28, as amended by Acts of 1977, Pub. L. 340, sec. 151 provid-
ed that this section take effect October 1, 1977.
13. SUPREME COURT OF INDIANA, APPELLATE REviEw OF SENTENCES. Rules 1 and
2. (effective January 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES].
14. In Beard v. State, 262 Ind. 643, 649, 328 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1975), the Indiana
Supreme Court stated:
The grant [in Article 7, § 4 of the Constitution of Indiana) appears to be
beyond our inherent power to review and revise those sentences that ex-
ceed constitutional limitations, a responsibility that we have previously
recognized.... Thus far, we have refrained from exercising this recently
granted power and believe that it can be properly exercised only under a
program of policies and procedures not yet established. We, therefore,
decline the defendant's prayer for a review of the sentence.
Since the Beard decision, the Supreme Court has consistently declined to review
sentences. Miller v. State, - Ind. - , 364 N.E.2d 129 (1977); Parker v. State, -
Ind. - , 358 N.E.2d 110 (1976); Delph v. State, - Ind. - , 332 N.E.2d 783 (1975);
Stroehr v. State, - Ind. -, 328 N.E.2d 442 (1975). See notes 33-37 infra and ac-
companying text.
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adopted the requirement for a statement of reasons when sentenc-
ing. A proposal is made for the adoption of a standard for appellate
review which may serve to curb sentencing abuses. Guidelines are
also suggested to aid bench and bar in the effective implementation
of these sentencing practices in our judicial system.
THE ARGUMENT FOR APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES
The general objectives sought to be achieved through appellate
review of judicial sentencing have been identified as:
1. The correction of the sentence which is excessive in
length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the
character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest;
2. The facilitation of the rehabilitation of the offender by
affording him an opportunity to assert grievances he may
have regarding his sentence;
3. The promotion of respect for law by correcting abuses
of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of
the sentencing process; and
4. The promotion of the development and application of
criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just."
Of these four objectives, apparently the most beneficial is that
of appellate review of sentences which will provide our criminal
system with a mechanism by which the grossly excessive sentence
can be corrected. A term of punishment imposed for a duration of
time which is neither necessary to protect the public interest nor
useful in terms of rehabilitating the criminal defendant is the most
obvious example of an excessive sentence. Excessiveness may also
manifest itself by more direct practices-the sentence which lacks
any affirmative basis in relation to the nature of the defendant and
the crime, and the sentence dictated by the trial judge's emotional
reactions to the defendant being prime examples. Since the underlying
rationale of sentence review is that consideration for the interest of
the public and the interest of the defendant is critical in determin-
ing the sentence to be imposed, the sentence which serves neither
interest should not be permitted to stand. 6
In addition to providing an opportunity to correct excessive
sentences, appellate review may operate to negate the defendant's
perception of the sentencing judge as one who possesses unbridled
15. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEw, supra note 5, at § 1.2, 7-8.
16. Id. at 21-25.
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power over his future. The elimination of this potential source of
hostility is worth pursuing, as Chief Justice Hennessey of the
Massachusetts Supreme Court reminds us, "[iut is certainly not in
the best interest of public security that the released prisoner come
out unnecessarily embittered and more dangerous because he has
served an inexplicable and ill-considered sentence." 7 Furthermore,
the availability of appellate review enhances the possibility that in
some instances respect for the sentencing process may be induced
by the opportunity to air grievances and thus provide an initial first
step towards rehabilitation. The attitude of the defendant in this
regard is not unimportant as a defendant who has an opportunity to
air his grievances concerning his punishment is more likely to ap-
proach rehabilitation with a positive attitude than one who is convinc-
ed that one person wronged him in passing judgment and there is
nothing which may be done about it."' The availability of review, and
its exercise in a fashion as to promote this respect thus offers a
potential for an affectation of the offender's attitude.
A third objective of appellate review of sentencing is the pro-
motion of respect for the law by providing the opportunity to cor-
rect sentencing abuses and to mete out justice in a manner which
contributes to the appearance of fairness." It seems clear that the
procedural guidelines which are designed to insure the respect for
individual rights before and during the criminal trial as well as the
opportunity to correct errors after trial that is available in every
other phase of the law, should be no less assured when the time
comes to deprive a person of his freedom. Such a check on the exer-
cise of the sentencing power should contribute to an increase in
respect for the legal system, and the effective implementation of the
power to correct the occasional sentencing abuse should
demonstrate that the system works."
A final objective in appellate review of sentencing is the
development of the basic principles of sentencing policy. If the
sentencing judge is required to articulate his reasoning when deter-
mining a sentence,"1 and the appellate courts similarly explain in
written opinions the basis for the modifications of a sentence on ap-
peal, the result could be a set of consistent criteria which may be
followed in arriving at sentencing decisions. Not only is it possible
17. Hennessey, aupra note 7, at 14.
18. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW. 8upra note 5, at 2.
19. Id. at 25-26.
20. Id. at 26-27.
21. See notes 70-84 infra and accompanying text.
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that this may contribute to the resolution of the problem of
disparate sentences, but on a broader scale it may lead to the for-
mulation of sound sentencing policy. The availability of sentencing
review offers the appellate courts the opportunity to play a leading
role in the achievement of this objective.2
The objection most frequently raised to appellate review of
sentences is that the availability of such review will open floodgates
which will drown the appellate courts in a deluge of frivolous ap-
peals. In England, whose sentences have been subject to appellate
review for some seventy years, this concern simply has not been
evidenced by the experiences of that country's judicial system.' In
addition, the apprehension that review of legal sentences would
severely overburden the appellate courts of this nation has been
proved unfounded by the experiences of those states that permit ap-
pellate review of sentences.' Indeed, perhaps the strongest argu-
ment in favor of appellate review of sentences is the estimation that
almost half of the appeals taken from criminal convictions are due to
the defendant's dissatisfaction with the sentence imposed." This
observation, along with the admission of many experienced appellate
judges that technical errors in the trial court proceedings are often
seized upon as a means to correct a sentence deemed to be too
severe,= suggest that appellate review of sentences may in actuality
effect judicial economy. By focusing the attention of the appellate
court on the root of the appellant's complaint, the defective
sentence, the additional time and expense involved in a full retrial
may be avoided by a remand exclusively for the purpose of
resentencing.
22. Id at 27-31.
23. Frankel, supra note 7, at 379-380. For a general discussion of the English
sentencing system, see Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Development
of Sentencing Policy: The English Experience, 20 ALA. L. REV. 193 (1968); Survey,
supra note 3, at 240-243; A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, supra note 5, at
130 (Meador Report, Appendix C).
24. Note, Statutory Structures for Sentencing Felons to Prison, 60 COLUM. L.
REv. 1134, 1166 (1960).
25. The calendars of the courts of appeal are crowded with cases which
have little merit other than an entreaty to the court to find some basis on
which a Draconian sentence can be upset. Reliable figures indicate that 40
to 50% of the time the appeal court is required to review cases which
would not be there had a reasonable sentence been pronounced.
Bennett, The Sentence-It Relations to Crime and Rehabilitatin, Of Prisons and
Justice, S. Doc. No. 70, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 307, 311 (1964).
26. A.B.A STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, supra note 5, at 30-31.
1978]
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SENTENCE REVIEW-THE INDIANA EXPERIENCE
Provisions for appellate review of sentences have been enacted
in slightly more than half of the states through legislation, case law,
or constitutional mandate." However, the number in which review is
realistically available in every serious case is much lower-approx-
imately fifteen states." Sentence review remains, as a practical mat-
ter, unavailable in many states in which it has been authorized due
to the reluctance of the appellate courts to overrule the discre-
tionary actions of the trial court judge. For the most part, sentenc-
ing continues to be viewed as an exclusive function of his discretion,
and as long as the sentence is within the statutory boundaries and
there is no clear evidence of abuse the sentence will not be modified
on appeal." The experience in Indiana with appellate review of
sentences, which while authorized, but not exercised, is typical
of other jurisdictions.
27. The number of states authorizing sentence review has been increasing
over the past two decades. European Approaches, supra note 4, at 195, lists the follow-
ing statutes and decisions which are in addition to the Indiana Constitutonal provi-
sions, infra notes 31-32:
ALASKA STAT. § 12.55 120 (Supp. 1972); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-2144 (1962);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1260 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-1-509 (1963); CONN. GEN.
STAT. §§ 51-194 to 96 (1960); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 641-24 (1968); IDAHO CODE ANN. §
19-2821 (1948); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 110A § 615 (b) (1968); IOWA CODE § 793.18 (1971); KAN.
STAT. § 22-3605 (1971); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 15, § 2141 (supp. 1973); MD. CODE ANN. §§
132-388 (1973); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 28 (1972); Mo. Sup. Ct. Rs. 27.04, 05, .06
(1953); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 2501-04 (1969); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2308 (1965); N.Y.
CONSOL. LAW ch. 11-A, § 470.15 (West 1971); OIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2953.07 (1954);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1066 (1958); OREG. REV. STAT. § 138.050 (1971); PA. STAT. tit.
17 § 211.504 (1962); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 251.17 (1971). State v. Johnson, 67 N.J. Supp.
414, 170 A.2d 830 (App. Div. 1961); Brooks v. State, 187 Tenn. 361, 215 S.W.2d 875
(1948).
Comment, U. PA. L. REv. 434, 436 (1960), lists the states which recognize the
power of the appellate courts to revise or reduce a sentence as Arizona, Arkansas,
Connecticut, Idaho, Iowa, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, and Pennsylvania. Coburn,
supra note 7, at 213, notes that "in certain instances Oregon and Tennessee allow ap-
pellate review." Mueller, Penology on Appea- Appellate Review of Legal but Ex-
cessive Sentences, 15 VAND. L. REV. 671, 677 (1962), lists fourteen states in which
modification of legal but excessive sentences is authorized by statutes or precedent,
adding Hawaii, Massachusetts, and New Jersey to the states enumerated above.
28. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 172 (1973); A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, supra note
5, at 13.
29. Coburn, supra note 7, at 212-216. This standard appears to be the majority
rule. See 24A C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1878 (1962), and the numerous authorities cited
there: "The discretion of the trial court in fixing the sentence, punishment, or costs
within the limits prescribed by law will not be reviewed or revised, except for abuse."
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The judicial articles adopted in the 1970 amendments" to the
Indiana Constitution provide that: "The Supreme Court shall have,
in all appeals of criminal cases, the power to review all questions of
law and to review and revise the sentence imposed.""1 This judicial
article also provides that the court of appeals, in all cases other than
direct review of administrative decisions, shall:
exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and con-
ditions as the Supreme Court shall specify by rules which
shall, however, provide in all cases an absolute right to
one appeal and to the extent provided by rule, review and
revision of sentences for defendants in all criminal cases.'
In Beard v. State," the Indiana Supreme Court was first
presented with an opportunity to exercise this authority. Here, the
court could have reduced a life sentence which had been imposed
upon the defendant. While the court recognized that it had been
granted this additional authority by the constitutional amendment,
it nevertheless declined to exercise it, stating:
The grant appears to be beyond our inherent power to
review and revise those sentences that exceed constitu-
tional limitations, a responsbility that we have previously
recognized.... Thus far, we have refrained from exercis-
ing this recently granted power and believe that it can be
properly exercised only under a program of policies and
procedures not yet established. We, therefore, decline the
defendant's prayer for a review of this sentence."
Since the Beard decision, the Indiana Supreme Court and court of
appeals" have consistently declined to invoke the judicial power to
review and revise sentences. Viewed against the background of this
30. The constitutional amendments were added on November 3, 1970, upon
voter ratification, and became effective January 1, 1972.
31. IND. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
32. IND. CONST. art. 7, § 6.
33. - Ind. __ , 323 N.E.2d 216 (1975).
34. Id. at 219 (citations omitted).
35. Miller v. State, - Ind. - , 364 N.E.2d 129 (1977); Parker v. State,
- Ind. __ , 358 N.E.2d 110 (1976); Chritchlaw v. State, - Ind. - , 346 N.E.2d
591 (1976); Thomas v. State, - Ind. - , 348 N.E.2d 4 (1976); Delph v. State, -
Ind. - , 332 N.E.2d 783 (1975); Stroehr v. State, __ Ind. - , 328 N.E.2d 422
(1975).
36. State ex rel. Taylor v. Allen Superior Court Criminal Felony Div.,
Ind.App. - , 366 N.E.2d 206 (1977); Willis v. State, - Ind.App. , 318 N.E.2d
385 (1974).
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experience, the recent promulgation of court rules to govern the ap-
pellate review of sentences may be an indication of the
preparedness on the part of the appellate judiciary to afford the
criminal defendant his constitutional right to sentencing review.7
THE SCOPE OF SENTENCING REVIEW"
In adopting its rules for the appellate review of sentences, the
Indiana Supreme Court has limited the scope of the appellate court's
review to the determination of whether the sentence imposed is
"manifestly unreasonable" when viewed in relation to the nature of
the offense and the offender:
1. The reviewing court will not revise a sentence
authorized by statute except where such sentence is
manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the of-
fense and the character of the offender.
2. A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no
reasonable person could find such sentence appropriate to
the particular offense and offender for which such
sentence was imposed."
By stating at the outset the standard which shall govern the scope
of the court's review, the supreme court has avoided the initial pro-
blem experienced in other jurisdictions of developing a workable
review system.40
37. APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note 13, Rule 1 provides:
1) Appellate review of the sentences imposed on any criminal defendant
convicted after the effective date of this rule is available as this rule pro-
vides.
2) The Supreme Court will review sentences imposed upon convictions
agreeable to the Court; the Court of Appeals will review sentences impos-
ed upon convictions agreeable to the Court of Appeals.
38. It may be noted that Rule 1 (2) of Appellate Review of Sentences, supra
note 13, prohibits appeal by the prosecution: "Appellate review of sentences under this
rule may not be initiated by the State." Compare with the Alaska statute, supra note
41.
While considerations of justice would demand the correction of the too-lienient
sentence as well as the sentence that is too severe, it is not clear whether a provision
for appeal by the state- especially in the context of permitting the reviewing court to
increase the sentence on appeal-would make a significant contribution to the objec-
tives sought by those who favor appellate review. For further elaboration on this
point, see A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REvIEW, supra note 5, at 56-57. The
discussion presented here will focus on the scope of sentencing review provided under
the rules.
39. APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES, supra note 13, Rule 2.
40. See Halperin, Sentence Review in Main. Comparisons and Comment 18
MAINE L. REv. 133, 150 (1966).
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As an example, in Alaska where sentencing review has been
authorized by statute since 1969,"1 the supreme court of Alaska has
wrestled with a variety of sentencing review standards, with the
result being that there is no clear articulation of the standards for
sentencing review for its lower trial courts to follow in fashioning
their sentences." One member of Alaska's appellate judiciary has
responded to the problem by suggesting that the pattern of develop-
ment of sentence review standards is irrelevant because the stan-
dards themselves are insignificant-what seems to be more impor-
tant is the outcome of each case." However, only through the for-
mulation and implementation of proper standards for the review of
sentences can the objectives of sentencing review be achieved." A
case-by-case review of sentencing decisions in the absence of stan-
dards cannot contribute to the development of rational sentencing
criteria. In this respect, the Indiana Supreme Court's formulation of
a standard to govern the scope of appellate review of sentences
enhances the possibility that sentencing review will achieve the
desired goal of greater fairness and rationality in sentencing deci-
sions. The extent to which this standard contributes to the develop-
ment of criteria for sentencing which is both "rational and just," will
depend in large measure on its interpretation as applied by the trial
courts and practicing bar.
Certainly one construction that may be posited is that the
"manifestly unreasonable" standard serves merely to embody the
principle to which the Indiana appellate courts have generally
held-i.e., that the determination of appropriate penalties for
41. ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.120 provides:
Appeal sentence: (a) A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the
Superior Court for a term or for aggregate terms exceeding one year may
be appealed to the Supreme Court by the defendant on the ground that
the sentence is excessive.
(b) A sentence of imprisonment lawfully imposed by the Superior Court
may be appealed to the Supreme Court by the state on the ground that
the sentence is too lenient; however, when a sentence is appealed by the
state and the defendant has not appealed the sentence, the court is not
authorized to increase the sentence but may express its approval or
disapproval of the sentence and its reasons in a written opinion.
42. "Today both bench and bar remain confused as to what the actual state of
Alaska sentence review law is; the criminal and the community fail to see concrete
progress toward the general objectives of sentence review." Note, Sentence Review in
Alaska. The Continuing Controversy, 6 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L. REv. 129, 144 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Sentence Review].
43. Erwin, Five Years of Sentence Review in Alaska, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALASKA L.
REv. 1, 20-21 (1975).
44. See notes 15-22 supra and accompanying text.
19781
230 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
criminal violations is exclusively a legislative function and that the
appellate courts have only a limited authority to review sentences
to determine if they violate any of the various constitutional provi-
sions concerning sentencing." This principle has been reiterated in a
number of opinions in which the appellate courts have indicated that
they will not set aside a sentence because it appears to be too
severe, but rather will review it only to determine if it is propor-
tioned to the nature of the offense involved, imposes "atrocious or
obsolete punishment," or is "grossly and unquestionably ex-
cessive.""
In fashioning a rule which emphasizes the review of sentences
authorized by statute,"7 it may be argued that the supreme court is
simply reflecting past holdings to the effect that where the penalty
fixed by the legislature does not exceed constitutional limitations,
the courts may not interfere." According to this view, the "manifest-
ly unreasonable" standard set forth in the new rules may represent
no more than the test of "proportionality" which has long been
available in accordance with the Indiana and United States Constitu-
tions to modify a disproportionally excessive sentence. 9 However, the
45. Sentences in criminal cases are limited by the provisions of the Indiana
Constitution which prohibit excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishment, and require
that sentences be proportioned to the nature of the offense involved. IND. CONST. art. 1
§ 16.
46. See Beard v. State, - Ind. - , 323 N.E.2d 216, 219 (1975); Rowe v.
State, - Ind. - , 314 N.E.2d 745, 749 (1974); Smith v. State, - Ind. - , 312
N.E.2d 896, 900 (1974); Clark v. State, - Ind. App. - , 311 N.E.2d 439 (1974); See
also Kerr, Criminal Law and Procedure, 9 IND. L. REV. 160, 192 (1975).
47. APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note 13, Rule 2 provides:
(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by statute
except when such sentence is manifestly unreasonable .... (Emphasis ad-
ded.)
Such a reading of the rule would not preclude appellate review where the sentence im-
posed is clearly illegal in that it exceeds the punishment fixed by the legislature.
48. Landlaw v. State, - Ind. - , 279 N.E.2d 230 (1972); McHaney v.
State, - Ind. App. - , 288 N.E.2d 284 (1972).
49. See Hollars v. State, - Ind. - , 286 N.E.2d 166, 170 (1972):
These are primarily legislative cosideratinns, and we are not at liberty to
set aside a conviction and sentence because, on the record, they seem too
severe. Blue v. State 224 Ind. 394, 67 N.E.2d 377 (1946); Mellot v. State
219 Ind. 646, 40 N.E.2d 655 (1942).
It is only when a criminal penalty is not graduated and proportion-
ed to the nature of the offense, or where it is grossly and unquestionably
excessive that this provision of the United States Constitution is intended
to apply. Weems v. United States (1910), 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544, 54 L.
Ed. 793 ....
See also Dickens v. State, 260 Ind. 285, 293, 295 N.E.2d 613, 619 (1973) in which the
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Indiana precedent of non-interference with the trial court's discre-
tion in imposing a sentence authorized by statute does not adequate-
ly address the problem of sentencing abuse as such a policy fails to
focus on the exercise of the court's discretion in selecting from alter-
native penalties within the limits established by the legislature.'
The more favored and perhaps more logical interpretation of
the "manifestly unreasonable" standard is that it is designed to
focus the attention of the reviewing court not only on the propor-
tionality of the punishment to the crime, but also on the manner in
which the trial judge exercises his discretion in sentencing. It may
be contended that sentencing review in accordance with the Indiana
rules must center both on the trial judge's assessment of the
character of the defendant and the nature of the crime committed,"'
and on his reasonings in selecting the punishment he impose." Such
an interpretation of the "manifestly unreasonable" standard is based
upon the emphasis in the rules on the approrpriateness of the
sentence as it relates not only to the nature of the offense, but also
to the character of the offender."
This construction of the scope of review afforded the appellate
judiciary in reviewing criminal sentences is logically consistent with
the appellate courts' previous decisions in declining to exercise the
review power provided by the Indiana Constitution. The Beard opi-
court observed: "The authority of the Supreme Court to modify or revise a sentence
has been constitutionalized [by Art. 7 § 4 of the Indiana Constitution]," thereby sug-
gesting that the new judicial article in the Constitution had added nothing to the
Supreme Court's preexisting inherent power of sentence review.
50. The general rule in this State is that this Court will not invade the
province of the legislature or the jury and impose a different sentence
from that authorized by law or issued by the jury so long as it is not
grossly disproportionate to the nature of the offense or unquestionably
excessive.
Delph v. State, 263 Ind. 385, 332 N.E.2d 783 (1975); Beard v. State, 262 Ind. 643,
323 N.E.2d 216 (1975). The penalty imposed in this case is within the statutory limit
and is not, in our view, grossly disproportionate or unquestionably excessive." Hall v.
State, Ind. - , 60 Ind. Dec. 532, 534 (1978).
51. See text accompanying notes 102-136 infr, in connection with discussion
of sentencing criteria in IND. CODE 34-4.1-4-7.
52. See text accompanying notes 89-98 infro, in connection with discussion of
requirement in IND. CODE 35-4.14-3 that sentencing court make a record of the reasons
for selecting the sentence that it imposes.
53. APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note 13, Rule 2.
(1) The reviewing court will not revise a sentence... except where such
sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the nature of the offense
and the character of the offender.
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nion" and subsequent decisions have stated that the reluctance to
review criminal sentences is based upon concern that the power con-
ferred by Article 7, §§ 4 and 6, goes beyond "the inherent power of
the courts to review and revise those sentences that exceed con-
stitutional limitations,"" and therefore cannot be rationally exercis-
ed until the supreme court has developed procedures for the use of
that power." Based on this reasoning, it follows that the rules pro-
mulgated for the implementation of the sentencing review power
would not represent a mere embodiment of past judicial principles.
To the contrary, it may be argued that the new rules encompass a
broader approach to sentencing policy under which the appellate
courts will exercise supervisory jurisdiction over the procedure by
which sentences are imposed. 7 Such an argument was advanced in
Justice White's well-reasoned concurring opinion in Gray v. State."
Justice White emphatically pointed out that the new judicial article
in the Indiana Constitution was included for the purpose of em-
powering the appellate courts to expand their traditionally limited
role in sentencing review by nullifying through appropriate revision
a trial judge's abuse of discretion in sentencing:
It seems to me to be so obvious to be indisputable, that
the inclusion in the new Article 7, section 4 of the clause
granting "the power ... to review and revise the sentenc-
ing imposed" was for the purpose of changing that situa-
tion [non-review of sentencing discretion] and not merely
for the purpose of constitutionalizing the existing ex-
ceedingly limited review and revisions practice."
The recent decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State
v. Leggeadrini" is illustrative of this suggested approach to
sentence review authority. By focusing on the reasoning of the court
(2) A sentence is not manifestly unreasonable unless no reasonable per-
son could find such sentence appropriate to the particular offense and of-
fender for which such sentence was imposed. (Emphasis added.)
54. Supra note 33.
55. See authorities cited supra notes 35-36.
56. See, e.g., Miller v. State, supra note 35, at 132.
57. It may be noted that the proposal in the 1970 Indiana Constitutional revi-
sion that the power of the appellate courts in criminal cases include the power to
review sentences is based on the "efficacious use to which this power has been put by
the Courts of Criminal Appeals in England." REPORT OF THE INDIANA JUDICIAL STUDY
COMMISSION 139-141 (1967). For a general discussion of the English sentencing system
see authorities cited supra note 23.
58. - Ind. App. - , 305 N.E.2d 886 (1974).
59. Id at 891 (emphasis in text).
60. 75 N.J. 150, 380 A.2d 1112 (1977).
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in determining the sentence, the established criteria may effectively
be employed to correct injustices which may result from the abuse
of judicial discretion. This ruling is all the more noteworthy in view
of the distinct similarity between the standards governing review of
sentences before the New Jersey appellate courts and those which
have been formulated by the Indiana Supreme Court."
In this instance, Leggeadrini, a sixty-six year old pensioner,
was charged with the fatal shooting of a twenty-six year old
neighbor in an incident which had been precipitated by a dispute
between the victim, defendant and his wife over possible damage to
the defendant's property arising from the victim's baliplaying near
Leggeadrini's front yard. On the date of the shooting, Leggeadrini,
while inside his house, overheard an argument between his wife and
the victim in which the victim had directed abusive remarks
towards Mrs. Leggeadrini. The defendant proceeded outside to
rebuke the victim for the manner in which he had addressed Mrs.
Leggeardrini, and when the victim declined to continue the argu-
ment any longer, Leggeardrini stated that he would shoot him. He
immediately grabbed a .22 caliber rifle from inside the doorway of
the house, cocked it and shot the victim, who then ran across the
street to his house where he collapsed and died. Leggeadrini then
went back into his house and summoned the police. In his version of
the incident, Leggeadrini stated that he had intended to do no more
than "hurt" the victim, claiming that he would have fired more than
one shot had he intended to kill."
Upon indictment for murder, Leggeadrini entered a plea of non
vult and was sentenced to a prison term of twenty-five to thirty
years, which was the equivalent of a maximum sentence permitted
for a conviction of second degree murder. At the sentencing hearing,
a presentence report and psychiatric evaluation of the defendant
were introduced to present a composite picture of an individual who
had been a solid member of the community and enjoyed a stable
family life. Leggeadrini had no prior criminal record, and prior to
61. Compare
[T]he scope of appellate review is normally limited to the question of
whether [the trial court's) discretion has been abused by the imposition of
a sentence which is manifestly excessive under the particular cir.
cumstance of the case....
75 N.J. at 157, 380 A.2d at 1116 (emphasis added), with
The reviewing court will not revise a sentence authorized by statute ex-
cept where such sentence is manifestly unreasonable in light of the
nature of the offense and the character of the offender.
APPELLATE REvIEw OF SENTENCES, supra note 13, Rule 2 (1) (emphasis added).
62. 75 N.J. at 153, 380 A.2d at 1114.
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his retirement had been a productive citizen holding continuous
employment at the same job for thirty-one years. He and his wife
lived on modest pension and social security benefits which he sup-
plemented with part-time work for the local school board."
On behalf of Leggeadrini, defense counsel alluded to his age,
lack of prior criminal involvement, stable background and extreme
remorse as personal factors mitigating any need for a substantial
period of incarceration. He argued further that the offense was an
isolated incident-an over-reaction to momentary stress-unlikely
to be repeated. In his brief statement to the court, Leggeadrini
displayed perplexity as to how a man of his temperament who had
minded his own business for many years could have fallen into such
a predicament. He reiterated his version of the unintentional nature
of the killing.'
In imposing sentence, the court acknowledged that rehabilita-
tion was not the primary sentencing consideration with respect to
murder committed in emotional-laden circumstances since the
minimal likelihood of repetition substantially lessens the need for
deterrence of the offender. In his oral statement of reasons the
sentencing judge nevertheless concluded that the defendant's con-
duct contained all of the elements of second degree murder and war-
ranted substantial punishment because of the seriousness of the
harm resulting from a relatively trivial provocation."
On appeal granted solely to consider the excessiveness of the
sentence, the Supreme Court of New Jersy emphasized that in the
interest of justice it had the power to modify any sentence that was
manifestly excessive, even if within statutory limits, although its
scope of appellate review was normally limited to the question of
whether the trial court has abused its discretion by imposing a
sentence which was manifestly excessive under the particular cir-
cumstances.u After considering the totality of circumstances
presented in this case, and weighing the factors relevant to ap-
pellate review of sentences, the court concluded that the sentence
imposed was manifestly excessive and warranted modification."
With regard to the reasoning of the sentencing court in deter-
mining the appropriate punishment to be imposed in this case, the
63. Id. at 114-1115.
64. Id. at 1115.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1116.
67. Id. at 1114.
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New Jersey Supreme Court noted that a proper aggravating factor
for the court's consideration was the insufficiency of the provocation
for the defendant's act. On the other hand, the opinion of the court
suggests that substantial mitigating factors concerning both the per-
sonal circumstances of the defendant and other details of his act
warranted the sentencing court's assessment of this crime for
sentencing purposes as being more in the nature of manslaughter
than second-degree murder." In particular, the court felt the fact
that the defendant summoned the police immediately after the
shooting, and had entered a plea of non vult even in the face of a
potential life imprisonment, as suggesting an acknowledgement of
grievous wrongdoing conducive to rehabilitation. Additionally,
defendant's prior non-involvement in any criminality and the
minimal prospect of any repetition of his wrongdoing operated to
overcome the concern for deterrence or societal protection through
the defendant's isolation." The court went on to point out that in
this context the defendant's advanced age, while not a basis for
mitigation insofar as his criminal liability was concerned, was
especially relevant. The court then suggested that where a person
has attained advanced age without acquiring a criminal record, a
sentencing judge may properly treat a single instance of criminality
as an aberrant episode which would permit a degree of leniency in
sentencing." Based on this evaluation of the relevant factors, the
court concluded that the sentence imposed in the case, which was
tantamount to life imprisonment for the defendant, was clearly un-
warranted and amounted to an abuse of discretion on the part of the
sentencing judge:
We differ with him ... on his ultimate determination that
the interests of society require a substantial term of in-
carceration for this defendant, despite the preponderance
of circumstances pointing to a lesser term of incarcera-
tion. It appears that the sentence more nearly fits the of-
fense than the offender.71
The court, accordingly modified the sentence to a term of imprison-
ment for a minimum of seven years and a maximum of ten years. 2
68. Id. at 1117-1118.
69. Id at 1118.
70. Id. This observation should not be understood as precluding the imposition
of a severe prison term when such is warranted by an appraisal of the offense or the
offender nothwithstanding the defendant's advanced age. Id.
71. Id. at 1119 (emphasis added).
72. Id. The maximum term of imprisonment authorized for manslaughter
under New Jersey criminal law is ten years. See id. at 1117 n.3.
1978]
236 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
As the Leggeadiini case poignantly demonstrates, appellate
review of sentencing may effectively be employed to curb those ex-
cesses which can result from the abuse of sentencing discretion. Our
appellate courts may similarly better serve the interests of justice
by adopting an interpretation of the "manifestly unreasonable" stan-
dard which insures that sentencing decisions are based upon ra-
tional criteria appropriately applied to the nature of the crime and
the character of the defendant.7'
THE REQUIREMENT FOR A STATEMENT OF REASONS
WHEN SENTENCING
As suggested by the foregoing discussion, a most apparent
argument in favor of requiring the trial court to present a statement
of its reasons when sentencing the criminal defendant is that it
serves as an invaluable aid to the reviewing court.7' It goes without
saying that if an appellate court is to make an intelligent review of
the sentence imposed, it must be provided with a record detailing
the sentencing court's reasoning. The requirement to elaborate upon
the reasons for each sentencing decision assists both in identifying
the factors considered, and in pinpointing the significance assigned
to each factor."
In addition to the aid that a statement of reasons by the
sentencing court provides the appellate courts, a number of other
73. It is noteworthy that the appellate courts of the State of Washington have
adopted a standard of review with regard to sentencing discretion which also parallels
that of the Indiana rules: "Where the decision or order of the trial court is a matter of
discretion, it will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of abuse of
discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised on untenable
grounds, or for untenable reasons." State ex. rel. Carroll v. Junker 79 Wash. 2d 12, 25,
482 P.2d 775, 784 (1971), (emphasis added). See also State v. Batten, 16 Wash. App.
313, 314, 556 P.2d 551 (1976); State v. Blight, 569 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Wash. 1977): "discre-
tion is abused only where it can be said no reasonable man would take the view
adopted by the trial court." Citing State v. Derefield, 5 Wash. App. 798, 799-800, 491
P.2d 694 (1971); State v. Hurst, 5 Wash. App. 146, 148, 486 P.2d 1136 (1971) (emphasis
added).
74. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, supra note 5, at 47. The courts
of this state have given increasing recognition to the value of a statement of reasens
and conclusions drawn from supportive facts as aid to appellate review in the context
of administrative hearings. See Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals, - Ind. - ,
245 N.E.2d 337 (1960); V.I.P. Limousine Service, Inc. v. Herider-Sinders, Inc., __ Ind.
App. -, 355 N.E.2d 441 (1976); Metropolitan Bd. of Zon. App., ect. v. Graves, __
Ind. App. - , 360 N.E.2d 848 (1977).
75. Kaufman, Second Circuit Note, 1973 Term, Forewor. The Sentencing
Process and Judicial Inscrutability, 49 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 215, 221 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Kaufman].
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valid reasons for such a requirement are presented. It has been sug-
gested, for example, that "a good sentence is one which can
reasonably be explained." 7 Therefore, requiring the judge to pass
sentence only after formulating a statement of the considerations
which he takes into account will act as a safeguard against the
danger that a judge will allow his emotions or other irrelevant fac-
tors to sway him in sentencing." Additionally, the fact that many
judges do not like to state all the reasons for the sentence imposed, 71
may be a good reason for requiring them to do so."
Another reason for requiring the trial court to record its state-
ment of reasons is that the record may be of great value to correc-
tion authorities if the sentence results in incarceration." The senten-
cing judge can provide even further assistance in this regard by of-
fering the correctional authorities comments on the defendant as he
has observed him." Providing an explanatory statement to the
defendant may in many cases also have therapeutic value in aid to
his rehabilitation."
A forceful argument has been made to the effect that due pro-
cess of law requires a written statement of reasons and facts sup-
porting the sentencing decision." Indeed, the United States
Supreme Court has acknowledged that a statement of reasons is a
prerequisite to determining the factors considered in sentencing. In
North Carolina v. Pearce," a case in which the defendant had suc-
ceeded in overturning his conviction on appeal and was to be re-
tried, the Court decided that to preclude the possibility that the
defendant be punished for seeking the reversal of his original con-
victions, any imposition of a harsher penalty for the subsequent con-
76. Youngdahl, Remarks Opening the Sentence Institute Program, Denver,
Colorado, 35 F.R.D. 387, 388 (1964).
77. Wyzanski, A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1292-93 (1952).
78. Symposium, supra note 2, at 284 (remarks of Judge Walsh).
79. See S. Frankel, supra note 7, at 370.
80. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, supra note 5, at 46. See MODEL
SENTENCING ACT § 10 (1972): "A copy of the investigation report, together with the
record of the sentencing hearing, shall be sent to the institute or any other agency to
the person that will supervise the defendant." [Hereinafter cited as MODEL SENTENCING
ACT.]
81. MODEL SENTENCING ACT § 10, supra note 80, Commentary at 25.
82. A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR APPELLATE REVIEW, supra note 5, at 46-47.
83. Berkowitz, The Constitutional Requirements for a Written Statement of
Reasons and Facts in Support of the Sentencing Decision" A Due Process Proposa4 60
IOWA L. REV. 205 (1974).
84. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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viction or affirmation must be supported by reasons affirmatively
stated on the record.0 This decision was the first by the Court to re-
quire a sentencing judge to explain the sentence imposed, and is
significant in that it embodies an implicit recognition that sentencing
decisions can be rationally justified and the factors upon which it is
based specified."
More recently, in Gardner v. Florida," a majority of the Supreme
Court agreed that the due process clause is violated when one charged
with murder is sentenced to death on the basis of confidential informa-
tion contained in his presentence report which was not made available
to him during the sentencing hearing. Of even greater significance is
the opinion of a plurality of the Court that the due process clause has
application to sentencing proceedings in general:
[I]t is now clear that the sentencing process, as well as the
trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Even though the defendant has no substantive
right to a particular sentence within the range authorized
by statute, the sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal
proceedings at which he is entitled to the effective
assistance of counsel.... The defendant has a legitimate in-
terest in the character of the procedure which leads to the
imposition of the sentence even if he may have no right to
object to a particular result of the sentencing process...."
As suggested by these authorities, one aspect of procedural due pro-
cess is a sentencing decision based upon rational criteria and a state-
ment of the court's reasoning to the defendant.
The emerging awareness of the need to impart procedural
safeguards into the sentencing process is reflected in the provision of
the Indiana Penal Code which requires:
Before sentencing a person for a felony the court must
conduct a hearing to consider the facts and circumstances
relevant to sentencing. The person is entitled to subpoena
and call witnesses and otherwise to present information in
85. I at 726.
86. See Pugh and Carver, supra note 5, at 42-43.
87. 430 U.S. 349 (1977). The Gardner decision is also of note in that the pro-
cedure for imposing the death penalty under which the defendant was sentenced
parallels that recently introduced to the Indiana Penal Code. See IND. CODE 35-50-2-9,
as added by Acts of 1977, Pub. Law 340, sec. 122 (effective October 1, 1977).
88. 430 U.S. 349 at 358 (opinion of J.J. Stevens, Stewart and Powell).
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his own behalf. The court shall make a record of the hear-
ing, including:
(1) a transcript of the hearing
(2) a copy of the presentence report; and
(3) a statement of the court's reasons for selecting the
sentence that it imposed."
By authorizing a separate hearing for sentencing at which the defen-
dant is entitled to call witnesses and make presentation of evidence,
this section embodies principles of fair hearing which are deemed to
be fundamental to due process." In addition to the presentence
report, 1 the evidence presented in the defendant's behalf, along
with the defendant's own statement, may provide the sentencing
judge with information and opinion about the defendant for his
critical evaluation." In this fashion the sentencing hearing takes on
the appearance of a quasi-judicial function"' in which, after ascertain-
ing the facts, the judge is permitted to exercise a limited amount of
discretion based upon considerations of public policy."
89. IND. CODE 35-4.1-4-3. For legislative history of this section, see note 9
supra.
90. "Pronouncement of judgment is a critical stage in the criminal pro-
secution with the constitutional right 'to appear and defend, in person and
with counsel' apply. A defendant convicted of a felony has the right to be
present at the pronouncement of judgement; to be represented by
counsel; and to receive a hearing at which he may present evidence with
respect to mitigation of sentence."
In re Cortez, 6 Cal. 3d 78, 88, 98 Cal. Rptr. 307, 313, 490 P.2d 819, 825 (1971) (citations
omitted).
The determination that procedural protections be available in the sentencing
process, however, does not necessarily imply that the hearing be conducted in accor-
dance with all the procedural requirements of the trial. As was noted by Justice
Stevens in his discussion of the sentence process in Gardner v. Florida- "The fact that
due process applies does not, of course, implicate the entire panoply of criminal pro-
cedural rights." 430 U.S. at 358 n.9.
91. As to the pre-sentence report generally, see IND. CODE 35-4.1-4-11,
35-4.1-4-17.
92. Pugh and Carver, supra note 5, at 36-37.
93. Thomas, Sentencing-The Case for Reasoned Decisions, 1963 CRIM. L.
REv. 243, 244 (1963).
94. At the time of this writing a proposal has been introduced before the In-
diana General Assembly to specify that the court's reasons for a sentence be stated on-
ly where aggravating or mitigating circumstances are taken into account. 103rd I.G.A.
(short sess.), S.B. No. 326. The purpose of this amendment is to clarify this section as it
relates to determinate sentencing under the Indiana Penal Code. See note 11 supra.
In a January 9, 1978 letter to the author, State Senator Leslie Duvall (R. In-
dianapolis), the chief sponsor of the Penal Code revisions, explains:
It was always my understanding that the legislated sentence, sometimes
referred to as the presumptive sentence, could be imposed by the court
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It may be noted that the above provision requires a hearing
and statement of reasons only for the sentencing of convicted felons,
presumably because the sentencing of dangerous offenders may ap-
propriately demand greater due process than is required in lesser
sentences of non-dangerous offenders." However, since the rules for
appellate review of sentences now provide that a person convicted
of any crime may avail himself of sentencing review," it may be an
advisable practice for the trial judge to prepare a statement of
reasons when sentencing both felons and misdemeanants.' The
small effort involved in transcribing such a record may in the long
run avoid a needless remand by an appellate court for clarification
of the sentencing decision."
DEVELOPING CRITERIA FOR SENTENCING DECISIONS
Given the recognition that requiring the sentencing judge to
state the reasons underlying each particular judgment may provide
at least an initial step towards rationality in the sentencing process,
the remaining task becomes the development of sound criteria to
guide the court in formulating the sentencing decision. A consistent
and authoritiative set of criteria upon which the sentencing court
may rely is of critical importance since problems of irrationality and
disparity in the sentencing process may be based on the lack of
agreement between judges as to the appropriate criteria to be ap-
plied in particular instances." Moreover, the need for such guidance
without further explanation. Since apparently there seems to be some
doubt concerning this, I am introducing a bill recommended by the Gover-
nor's Criminal Code Study Commission which will clearly so state. Where
for any reason the judge wishes to mitigate or aggravate the sentence, he
must do so after a hearing and must state his reasons therefor.
Letter on file with the University of Notre Dame Law School Legislative Research
Service.
95. MODEL SENTENCING ACT. supra note 80, commentary at 24.
96. See APPELLATE REVIEW OF SENTENCES, supra note 13, Rule 1. "(1) Ap-
pellate review of the sentence imposed on any criminal defendant convicted after the
effective date of this rule is available as this rule provides." (Emphasis added).
97. As defined in the Penal Code, the term "crime" encompasses both felonies
and misdemeanors. See IND. CODE 35-41-1-2.
98. See, e.g., Andrews v. State, 552 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1976) (where appellate
court unable to discern the basis for the sentence, case remanded for sentencing pro-
cedures in accordance with established criteria); See text accompanying note 143 infra.
99. "Irrational sentencing along the criteria may occur because a decision-
maker may be considering other criteria, such as willingness to plead guilty, prior
record, or institutional behavior. Thus, the criticism of irrationality leveled against
decision-makers might in fact mask a problem of duplicate or confusing criteria."
Zalman, supra note 7, at 268-269.
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in sentencing is readily apparent when one considers the insignifi-
cant amount of training the trial judiciary receives for the execution
of the awesome responsibility to impose punishment. Judge Craven,
of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, has described this state of
affairs in his lament:
What is now an appropriate sentence? All my life I have
wished for precision in the art of sentencing, and it eludes
me. It seems to me incongruous that trial judges, without
either training or experience in penology, are accorded
finality in the determination of punishment....
Even today one can graduate from the nation's best
law schools without receiving so much as one hour of in-
struction in penology. It should not be surprising that this
is so-for penology is not law: it is sociology. The only law
is the maximum sentence. When I was a trial judge, and
charged with the responsibility of sentencing, I used to
make myself scan and sometimes read the quarterly en-
titled "Federal Probation" devoted to the science of
penology. That, plus attendance at a sentencing institute
and visits to three prisons, comprised nearly all of my
training and experience for the sentencing function. I
think it not enough. I have about concluded that the trial
judges I have known (including me, especially) are not as
qualified by education and experience as are those from
other disciplines to decide whether a man should go, nor
how long he should remain in prison. 1
This statement serves to underscore the problem in light of the fact
that Judge Craven issued this opinion when called upon to hear an
appeal regarding a sentence which he himself had imposed as a trial
judge-and could not himself recall the factors relied upon in impos-
ing the sentence.01
Viewed against this background, one of the more innovative
provisions of the revised Indiana Penal Code is the section designed
100. United States v. Miller, 361 F. Supp. 825, 826-27 (W.D.N.C. 1973). Ju dge
Craven then went on to advocate the use of panels of persons with diverse sociological
expertise in sentensing. Id The use of such panels has been adopted by three federal
districts (the Eastern District of Michigan, the Eastern District of New York, and the
Northern District of Illinois). See discussion in M. FRANKEL, 8upra note 7, at 69-74. The
use of a sentencing commission has also been proposed in the revisions of the federal
criminal code. Zalman, supra note 7, at 266. See also Korbakes, Should the "Judge's
Sound Discretion" Be Explained?, 59 JUDICATURE 185, 187 (1975).
101. 361 F. Supp. at 827. He thus assumed that reliance had been placed on the
defendant's prior record which, because the case involved a Tucker problem, made a
considerable difference in the sentence finally imposed. Id.
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to prescribe definite criteria to guide the court in sentencing.1 In
accordance with these criteria, the court, when sentencing any
criminal defendant' must consider the risk that the person will
commit another crime, the nature and circumstances of the crime
committed, and the prior criminal record, character and condition of
the person. '" Additionally, this code section provides that the court
may consider the following factors as mitigating circumstances or as
favoring a suspended sentence and the imposition of probation:
(1) The crime neither caused nor threatened serious
harm to persons or property, or the person did not
contemplate that it would do so.
(2) The crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to
recur.
(3) The victim of the crime induced or facilitated the
offense.
(4) There are substantial grounds tending to excuse or
justify the crime, though failing to establish a
defense.
(5) The person acted under strong provocation.
(6) The person has no history of delinquency or criminal
activity, or he has led a law-abiding life for a substan-
tial period before commission of the crime.
(7) The person is likely to respond affirmatively to proba-
tion or short-term imprisonment.
(8) The character and attitudes of the person indicate
that he is unlikely to commit another crime.
(9) The person has made or will make restitution to the
victim of the crime for the injury, damage, or loss
sustained.
102. IND. CODE 35-41-4-7 (effective October 1, 1977). For legislative history of
this section, see note 12 supra. See also INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION, IN-
DIANA PENAL CODE, Proposed Final Draft 191-193 (1974).
It has been suggested that the enumeration of relevant factors to be considered
in mitigation or aggravation of punishment is a judgment properly reserved to the
legislature which, as the embodiment of the representative will of society, is in a bet-
ter position than the courts to the objectives of criminal sanctions. See M. FRANKEL,
supra note 7, at 40-43; S. RUBIN, H. WEIHOFEN. G. EDWARDS AND S. ROSENQWEIG, THE
LAW OF CRIMINAL CORRECTIONS 649-50 (1963).
103. Unlike the provisions for hearing, which applies only to the sentencing of
convicted felons, the list of sentencing criteria which must be considered by the courts
applies to sentences for all crimes-both felonies and misdemeanors. See IND. CODE
35-41-1-2 for definition of "crime" referenced.
104. See text of IND. CODE 35-41-4-7(a), supra note 10.
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(10) Imprisonment of the person will result in undue hard-
ship to himself or his dependents.""
The sentencing court may also take into account these factors
as aggravating circumstances, or as favoring the imposition of con-
secutive terms of imprisonment:
(1) The person has recently violated the conditions of
any probation, parole, or pardon granted him.
(2) The person has a history of criminal activity.
(3) The person is in need of correctional or rehabilitative
treatment that can best be provided by his com-
mitment to a penal facility.
(4) Imposition of a reduced sentence or suspension of the
sentence and imposition of probation would
depreciate the seriousness of the crime.
(5) The victim of the crime was sixty-five [651 years of
age or older.
(6) The victim of the crime was mentally or physically
infirm.'"
This listing of criteria is expressly intended not to be exhaustive.',
The authorization for the sentencing court to take these enumerated
factors into account in decreasing or increasing a sentence is
moreover discretionary; U and in contrast to the legislative mandate
that the nature of the crime, the character of the offender and the
risk that he will commit another crime be considered in all criminal
sentencing decisions.'
As the Code thus suggests, the sentencing court is authorized
to exercise its discretion in determining the aggravating or
mitigating factors pertinent to the imposition of a particular
sentence. Discretion in the context of sentencing, however, is not
105. IND. CODE 35-41-4-7(b).
106. IND. CODE 35-41-4-7(c).
107. IND. CODE 35-41-4-7(d). The criteria listed in subsections (b) and (c) of this
section do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the
sentence.
108. IND. CODE 35-41-4-7
(b) The court may consider these factors as mitigating circumstances or
as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing probation.
(c) The court may consider these factors as aggravating circumstances
or as favoring imposing consecutive terms of imprisonment. (Emphasis ad-
ded).
109. IND. CODE 35-41-4-7: "(a) In determining what sentence to impose for a
crime, the court shall consider .... " (Emphasis added).
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synonymous with mere decision-making. The background of the
defendant, his motives, attitude and demeanor, and the peculiarities
of the crime all must be assessed in formulating the sentencing deci-
sion. Indeed, a rational approach to sentencing contemplates the ex-
ercise of discretion based upon a process of reasoning which takes
into account facts that are in the record, or are reasonably derived
from the record, and a conclusion based upon logical rationale.1" The
availability of appellate review of sentences heightens the
significance of the sentencing court's evaluation of the facts and cir-
cumstances bearing upon the punishment imposed, as the opportuni-
ty is present to challenge the reasonableness of the court's assess-
ment of both the offense and offender."' While the enumeration of
criteria in the Penal Code provides considerable guidance to the
court in fashioning an appropriate penalty, it cannot capture the uni-
queness of each individual brought before the court for sentencing.
Thus, when weighing the factors relevant to his decision the senten-
cing court may find further guidance in the precedents of those
jurisdictions which, by combining appellate review of sentences with
the requirements for a statement of reasons when sentencing,"2
have developed a sound body of criteria for their courts to draw
upon in sentencing. Although not numerous, these decisions suggest
that agreement can be reached as to criteria applicable to the varie-
ty of sentencing determinations.
Following the lead of the American Bar Association Standards
for Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures,"' a predominant
number of states, including Indiana, which have authorized appellate
110. State v. Hutnik, 39 Wis. 2d 754, 764, 159 N.W.2d 733, 738 (1968): "there
should be evidence in the record that discretion was in fact exercised and the basis of
that exercise of discretion should be set forth,"
111. See notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
112. The following states in addition to Indiana, have expressly provided that a
written statement of reasons accompany the sentencing decision: ALASKA STAT. §
12.55.075 (Supp. 1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 51-195 (1977 Cum. Supp.); ME. REV.
STAT. § 2142 (1977-78 Cum. Supp.); Super. and County Cts. (Crim.) R. 3:21-4(e); N.D.
CENTRY CODE § 12-55-30; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 77-35-21, 77-62-8(c); McCleary v. State, 49
Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 572 (1971).
In some jurisdictions the court is required to set forth its reasons only when imposing
a minimum term for a felony conviction. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF
FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, Final Report, § 3201, 284-286; New York Penal Law, § 70.000
(3)(b) (McKinney). Pennsylvania has flatly rejected the requirement. See, e.g., Commis-
sioner v. Olson, 372 A.2d 1207 (Pa. Super. 1977).
113. A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards for Senten-
cing Alternatives and Procedures § 2.2 (Approved Draft 1968). See also A.B.A. STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO PROBATION § 1.3 (Approved Draft 1970).
JUDICIAL SENTENCING
review of the trial court's reasoning in sentencing have set forth the
primary factors to be considered in determining an appropriate
sentence. These factors include the gravity of the offense, the
character of the offender and the need for protection of the public.1 '
Additional factors which may be considered have been suggested by
State v. Killory," wherein the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
criteria relevant to sentencing determinations include:
the defendant's personality, character, and social traits,
the result of a presentence investigation, the vicious or
aggravated nature of the crime, the degree of defendant's
culpability, the defendant's demeanor at trial, the defen-
dant's age, educational background and employment
record, the defendant's remorse, repentance and
cooperativeness, the defendant's need for close
rehabilitative control, and the rights of the public."'
A study conducted by the YALE LAW JOURNAL has identified
the following as being one or more of the multiple objectives of
criminal sanctions:
rehabilitation of the convicted offender into a noncriminal
member of society; isolation of the offender from society
to prevent criminal conduct during the period of confine-
ment; deterrence of other members of the community who
might have tendencies toward criminal conduct similar to
those of the offender (secondary deterrence) and deter-
rence of the offender himself after release; community
condemnation or the purpose of maintaining respect for
the norms themselves; and retribution or the satisfaction
of the community's emotional desire to punish the of-
fender. 1 '
In State v. Chaney,"8 the Alaska Supreme Court found the
above set of specific objectives to be within the scope of its constitu-
tional mandate to administer a penal system based upon the dual
114. See People v. Henley, - Colo. App. - , 539 P.2d 496 (1975); Rosado
v. State, 70 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 69 (1975); McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182
N.W.2d 512 (1972). See also People v. Craig, 47 Ill. App. 3d 242, 361 N.E.2d 736, 745
(1977).
115. 73 Wis. 2d 400, 243 N.W.2d 475 (1976).
116. State v. Killory, 73 Wis. 2d at 408, 243 N.W.2d at 481, citing State v. Tew,
54 Wis. 2d 361, 195 N.W.2d 615 (1972).
117. Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A Connecticut
Case Study, 69 YALE L. J. 1453, 1455 (1960) (footnotes omitted).
118. 477 P.2d 441 (Alaska 1970).
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principles of reformation and the need for protection of the public" '
and accordingly has made these sentencing criteria the foundation of
sentence review in that state. "
The New Jersey Supreme Court, which has had numerous occa-
sions to consider the factors involved in deriving a just sentence in
accordance with its rules authorizing appellate review, " has sug-
gested that the aims of penology include "retribution, rehabilitation,
deterrence and sequestration of dangerous persons."' " Of these,
deterrence and rehabilitation are the most emphasized, with retribu-
tion being the least favored.'" That state's highest court has also
noted that in fixing a sentence a judge should:
consider the gravity of the crime and appropriate punish-
ment therefore, deterrence, protection of the public,
rehabilitation and any other factors or circumstances rele-
vant to the particular situation.'"
Chief Justice Weintraub of New Jersey, in his consideration of
this aspect of the admininstration of justice, has further suggested
that where "the offense has strong emotional roots or is an isolated
event unassociated with a pressing public problem, there is room for
greater emphasis upon the circumstances of the individual of-
fender."' " This conclusion is apparently based on Weintraub's skep-
ticism concerning the efficacy of punishment as a deterrent to
crimes "steeped in emotional pressures" or which are "isolated ex-
cursions beyond the pale of the law induced by engulfing cir-
cumstances.""' With regard to crimes not involving emotional fac-
tors, Weintraub offers that the sentencing judge may properly give
paramount concern to the magnitude of the crime and the deter-
rance of others rather than to the attributes of the offender. A sanc-
tion may be fashioned which will neither diminish the gravity of the
offense nor encourage would-be criminals to act with any expecta-
tion of leniency or impunity.'"
119. Alaska Const. Art. I § 12.
120. Note, Sentence Review, supra note 42, at 130-31.
121. N.J. Super. and County Crts. (Crim.) R. 2:10-3.
122. State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. 197, 200-202, 162 A.2d 851 (1960).
123. State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. at 199-200, 162 A.2d at 852. See also State v. Dun-
bar, 69 N.J. 333, 339, 354 A.2d 281 (1976).
124. State v. Jones, 66 N.J. 563, 568, 334 A.2d 20, 22 (1975).
125. State v. Ivan, 33 N.J. at 202, 162 A.2d at 853.
126. Id. at 851.
127. Id. See also State v. Sherwin, 127 N.J. Super. 370, 380, 317 A.2d 414 (App.
Div.), cert denied, 65 N.J. 569, 325 A.2d 703 (1974).
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Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Sentencing
The New Jersey appellate courts have also pointed to an addi-
tional number of generalized factors which may be appropriately
considered in mitigation of punishment. For example, the absence of
any prior record of arrests may indicate the inadvisability of in-
carceration as a means to the rehabilitation goal. A voluntary plea
of guilty along with cooperation with the police may in appropriate
circumstances evidence some promise that the defendant can be
rehabilitated by lesser punishment than the circumstances might
otherwise require. Where the offender is young and rehabilitation is
the primary goal of sentencing, the "human cost" incidental to a par-
ticular disposition may militate in favor of compromising the other-
wise weighty concern for deterrence of others. Integrated family
and community relationships, a stable home environment, steady
employment, as well as a defendant's "outstanding personal record"
are also significant factors. While advanced age, per se does not
preclude imposition of a custodial sentence, a defendant's age, state
of health and the potential effect of incarceration thereon are valid
considerations to be weighed by the sentencing judge in determin-
ing the appropriate sentence.'
An appropriate aggravating factor for the court to take into ac-
count in sentencing is the criminal history of the defendant.'" The
defendant's record of prior arrests'8 may be properly considered
along with evidence of crimes for which the defendant has been in-
dicted but not convicted, 8 so long as the sentencing judge does not
permit the sentence to vary because of his belief that the defendant
is guilty of unrelated, pending criminal charges."u Such considera-
tion does not constitute double jeopardy since the defendant is not
punished a second time for the same offense, and the repetition of
criminal conduct aggravates his guilt and justifies heavier penalties
128. See State v. Leggeadrini, 75 N.J. 150, 159, 380 A.2d 1112, 1117 (1977) (cita-
tions omitted).
129. See IND. CODE 35-4.1-4-7(c), (2) See also text accompanying note 106 supra.
130. State v. Dainard, 85 Wash. 2d 624, 537 P.2d 760 (1975); accord United
States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971). See also Williams v. New York, 337
U.S. 241 (1949).
Such arrest records have been considered among the relevant data to be
evaluated in sentencing according to a study conducted by the National College of the
State Judiciary. See REVELLE, SENTENCING AND PROBATION 127 (1973).
131. United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977).
132. Com. v. LeBlanc, - Mass. __ ,346 N.E.2d 874 (1976). See also Com. v.
Settipane, - Mass. App. - , 368 N.E.2d 1213, 1217 (1977).
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when he is again convicted.1" Even facts disclosed during the course
of a trial which ended in acquittal or was reversed on appeal may be
considered by the court.'" The defendant's lack of remorse and
failure to show a penitent spirit in the aftermath of a serious offense
may also be properly considered in imposing a severe sentence, even
though otherwise mitigating factors are present on the record,'" as
may the belief of the sentencing judge that the defendant has com-
mitted perjury at the trial.'"
THE SENTENCING COURT'S DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE CRITERIA
The approach to sentencing review as undertaken by the state
appellate courts which review the reasoning of the sentencing judge
varies among the jurisdiction. In Wisconsin, for example, the trial
judge is afforded wide discretion in determining an appropriate
sentence in a particular case. The appellate courts of Wisconsin have
made it clear that all that is required of a trial judge is to state the
facts upon which he predicates the sentence, and give the reasons
for his conclusions. If there is evidence that his discretion was pro-
perly exercised and the sentence imposed was the product of that
discretion, the trial judge was fully complied with the standards.'"
Thus the reviewing courts of Wisconsin have upheld the imposition
of a maximum sentence for a first offender on the charge of fire-
bombing, solely on the basis of the gravity of the offense involved.'"
Likewise, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has affirmed the sentence
of extended incarceration imposed on a first offender convicted of in-
decent liberties with a minor because the trial court concluded that
it was necessary to protect the public from such further criminal ac-
tivities by the defendant.1" The Alaska Supreme Court, although
stressing the importance of a thorough explanation of the sentence
133. "To argue that the presumption of innocence is appointed by considering
unproved criminal activity is as implausible as taking the double jeopardy clause to
bar reference to past convictions." United States v. Doyle, 348 F.2d 715, 721 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 843 (1965); United States v. Metz, 470 F.2d 1140 (3d Cir. 1972),
cert denied, 411 U.S. 919 (1973). See also State v. Burton, 52 Ohio St. 2d 21, 368
N.E.2d 297 (1977).
134. United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d at 1175.
135. People v. Bigsby, 52 Ill. App. 3d 277, 367 N.E.2d 358 (1977).
136. See Fox v. State, 569 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Alaska 1977), and authorities cited
therein. This is to be distinguished from the rule that a sentence may not be
augmented because a defendant refuses to confess or invokes his privilege against self-
incrimination. Id. at 1338.
137. Anderson v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 361, 251 N.W.2d 768, 769-770 (1977) (quoting
Bastian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 240, 248, 194 N.W.2d 687, 691 (1972)).
138. Chaney v. State, 44 Wis. 2d 454, 171 N.W.2d 339 (1969).
139. Bastian v. State, 54 Wis. 2d at 247, 194 N.W.2d 687 (1972).
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imposed, has ruled that a sentence will not be declared defective
under its statute""0 if all the goals announced in State v. Chaney"1
are not discussed in the record."' Nonetheless, Alaska's highest
court has maintained that if the sentencing court's stated reasons
are so lacking in completeness as to prevent the appellate court
from discerning the basis for the sentence, it will be remanded for
further sentencing procedures in accordance with the Chaney
criteria. '"
Among those jurisdictions in which the sentencing judge must
articulate the criteria upon which he relies in formulating a sentenc-
ing decision there is apparent agreement that the determination of
an appropriate sentence involves the judicious balancing of many
and often competing values; and therefore the weight which he may
attribute to each factor is left to his discretion.'" The Alaska
Supreme Court, for example, has upheld imposition of a fifteen year
concurrent sentence upon a defendant convicted of four counts of
140. The Alaskan sentencing statute is substantially the same as that enacted
in Indiana: Compare ALASKA STAT. § 12.55:
Imposition of sentence. (a) In addition to any other requirement of
law relating to the imposition of sentences, at the time of imposing
sentence for the conviction of a felony, the court shall prepare a sentenc-
ing report as part of the record to include the following:
(1) a verbatim record of any sentencing hearing made,
witnesses, the prosecuting attorney, the defense attorney,
and the defendant;
(2) the reasons for selecting the particular sentence impos-
ed;
(3) specific findings on all material issues of fact and on all
factual questions required as a prerequisite to the selection
of the sentence imposed;
(4) a precise statement of the terms of the sentence impos-
ed, and the purpose the sentence is intended to serve;
(b) The sentencing report required under (a) of this section shall be fur-
nished to the Department of Law, the defendant, the Division of Correc-
tions and the Alaska Parole Board, Department of Health and Social Ser-
vices,
with IND. CODE 35-4.1-4-3, supra note 89 and accompanying text.
141. See note 111 supra.
142. Perrin v. State, 543 P.2d 413 (Alaska 1975).
143. Andrews v. State, 552 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1976). See notes 110-113 supra.
144. "Judicial discretion is a composition of many things, among which are con-
clusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with
regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or
capriciously." State v. Blight, - Wash. __ , 569 P.2d 1129, 1131, (citations omitted).
See also Nicholas v. State, 477 P.2d 447, (Alaska 1970); Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 875,
(Alaska 1968); People v. Henley, 539 P.2d 496, 499 (Colo. 1975), Ocanas v. State, 70 Wis.
2d 179, 185, 223 N.W.2d 457, 461 (1975).
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armed robberty, asault with a dangerous weapon, felon in possession
of weapon, and probation violation where, in view of the defendant's
prior record and rehabilitation failures and the dangerous nature of
his acts, the trial court in weighing the objectives of sentencing did
not emphasize the goal of rehabilitation." Some explanation of the
court's reasoning, however, must appear on the record for the ap-
pellate court's scrutiny. Thus a judgment of conviction which con-
tains only the statement: "Extremely serious offense. Punishment
necessary," would not fulfill the obligation of the sentencing court to
consider the gravity of the crime and appropriate punishment,
general and specific deterrence, protection of the public, rehabilita-
tion of the defendant and the other circumstances relevant to the
particular sentence." Indeed, the courts of some states have gone so
far as to suggest that the failure to state the reasons supporting a
sentence, when reasons are required to be stated, is in itself an
abuse of discretion on the part of the sentencing court subject to ap-
pellate review."
CONCLUSION
The problem of disparate treatment of the criminal offender
resulting from unguided judicial sentencing discretion presents a
major and pervasive challenge to our criminal justice system with
which all attorneys, legislators, judges, and most importantly, the
general citizenry should be concerned. So long as the rationale
underlying the punishment imposed remains a mysterious aspect of
our sentencing procedure, the possibility exists for returning the of-
fender who can be rehabilitated to society as a more dangerously
embittered individual than before he began his experience with the
judicial system:
When the sentence is imposed, the darkness deepens for
the defendant; there usually is . . . little or nothing to
show that a reasoned judgment is being rendered. This is
not to imagine that the average defendant, doomed to a
term of confinement, is likely to find pleasure or solace in
a coherent rationale for the afflication. It is to say that
the failure to explain, especially in light of the ample time
for later brooding, lends a quality of baleful mystery
rather than open justice. At least the absence of an ex-
145. Pike v. State, 570 P.2d 1066 (Alaska 1977).
146. State v. Sanducci, 150 N.J. Super. 400, 375 A.2d 1216 (1977).
147. See Gray v. State, 159 Ind. App. 200, 305 N.E.2d 886 (1974); McCleary v.
State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512, 522 (1971) (concurring opinion).
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planation does nothing to quell the disposition to suspect
unfairness, fired later by encounters with prisoners who
have much lighter sentences based upon circumstances
that seem, or are perceived to be (or simply, are), essen-
tially identical.1
As this article suggests, a first step towards decreasing the lack
of uniformity and rationality in our sentencing system is the com-
bination of appellate review of sentencing decisions with the re-
quirement for an articulation of the sentencing court's reasons sup-
porting the punishment imposed. Such a combination may offer
some reassurance to the accused that his liberty is not being revok-
ed in a wholly arbitrary fashion.1 ' The review of sentencing deci-
sions may also assist in identifying the criteria considered by the
sentencing court and determining the relative weight to be assigned
each factor in a given circumstance. Furthermore, the adoption of an
active approach to sentencing review by our appellate judiciary may
establish a body of precedent upon which the trial court may rely in
the fashioning of well-reasoned sentencing decisions.
The recently-enacted provisions of the Indiana Penal Code
governing the sentencing procedure employed in conjucntion with
the authorization for appellate review of sentences announced by
our Supreme Court thus presents a significant possibility for the im-
provement of the criminal justice system in Indiana.
148. M. FRANKEL, supra note 7, at 13-14.
149. Kaufman, supra note 75, at 221.
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